LIVING WAGE LEVINAS NC:

We categorize and reduce objects to develop a picture about the world. But encountering a human Other creates a problem since this agent would have its own set of categories and perspective. This creates an unbridgeable epistemic gap since I can never subsume my own perspective and understand what the Other sees. You can never resolve which categories imposed upon the world are real because they lack the reality of the objects you are observing. You and the Other do not share the same view; you each access one metaphysical world. Before the mind tried to totalize objects, but the Other has a position that I can’t occupy. I can reduce the Other to my own categories, but there is a still a gap. Philosophies like the 1AC systemize our understanding into one universal ideology or principle. Agents cease to be unique; the Other becomes an extension of oneself and no longer a distinct individual.

The standard is **recognizing incompleteness of the subject.** When I claim to understand the Other without letting the Other speak for itself, I engage a perception of it, not the Other as a sovereign. This means we must reject totalizing other agents. This allow us to maintain separateness of the Other. Brackets for clarity. **BEAVERS:[[1]](#footnote-1)** If we can accept this notion that ideas are inventions of the mind, that ideas are, when it comes down to it, only interpretations of something, and if ethics, in fact, is taken to refer to real other persons who exist apart from my interpretations, then we are up against a problem: there is no way in which ideas [cannot], on the current model, refer to independently existing other persons and as such, ideas cannot be used to found an ethics. There can be no pure practical reason until after contact with the other is established. Given this view towards ideas, then, anytime I take the person in my idea to be the real person, I have closed off contact with the real person; I have cut off the connection with the other that is necessary if ethics is to refer to real other people. This is a central violence to the other that denies the other his/her own autonomy. Levinas calls this violence "totalization" and it occurs whenever I limit the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, or otherwise. Indeed, it occurs whenever I already know what the other is about before the other has spoken. Totalization is a denial of the other's difference, the denial of the otherness of the other. That is, it is the inscription of the other in the same. If ethics presupposes the real other person, then such totalization will, in itself, be unethical. If reducing the other to my sphere of ideas cuts off contact with the other, then we are presupposing that contact with the other has already been established. And if contact with the other cannot be established through ideas, then we must look elsewhere.

alternate fwk:

Ethics must be first philosophy. We must recognize the content and force of our obligations prior to any other philosophic and intellectual enterprise. Ethics does not depend upon some sort of antecedent deduction from external principles, but is a self-evident authoritative framework.

There are three warrants:  
1. Engaging in any academic discipline presupposes we should be engaging in it. We have reason to study epistemology, or reason to study the field in a particular way. However, to have that reason is already to presuppose the realm of the ethical. Thus, any philosophic movement already presupposes the nature of ethical commitments for instance the Enlightenment value of absolute truth. This means some methodological value exists non-methodologically.   
2. It is impossible to derive an imperative from an indicative. For example, the fact that I have an impulse or that something will kill me cannot itself provide moral reason unless we already attach a normative precept – like that I ought to listen to the impulse for some reason, or that my death would be bad. This is inescapable; either you make an irreducibly normative judgment somewhere or the conclusion remains merely indicative. This means that ethics cannot lie on any other non-ethical foundation – the idea of being able to use the world to explain ethics is contradictory.

3. Other explanatory accounts fail – we can’t understand ethics in any terms but the ethical. Displaying the external “rationality” of ethics is the problem with displaying the rationality of anything else we already do, like playing games. Even the way we justify arguments is also an unjustified normative part of our life. Our manner of reasoning practically is not correct in itself, but rather a product of how we live and are built.

The conclusion is that ethics must begins in the first confrontation with the other prior to any philosophical systematization. Because ethics is first philsophy, it cannot be mediated by any conceptual categorization. All totalization does this. When you sort people into categories or treat people differently based on those categories then your ethical obligation is not first, because you understand its content in a mediated fashion. Totalization cannot give rise to our obligations because our obligations had to be plain prior to the totalization; if my totalization results in treating you at all differently, I must be inconsistent with my obligation because my obligation was full and evident to myself before the totalization occurred.

This obligation to the Other is undeniable. If we have additional obligations that come after totalization, ethics is not first philosophy – if any part of our obligation is derivative on something afterwards, then that part would preclude us knowing what to do in the first place. I have to be able to know right and wrong without theorizing otherwise I cannot know that I should theorize. I wouldn’t have enough information to derive right or wrong.

**And,** my experience of the world demonstrates the limits to my own cognition, so claiming to speak for the other cannot be justified, even conceptually. **BLUM:[[2]](#footnote-2)** The experience of transcendence is, at bottom, the experience of having my interiority brought into question ontologically, epistemologically, and morally. Ontologically, I find that I am not the only possible source of reality. Although I am capable of creating, I experience a presence within the world that so overflows and escapes from my experience that I could not have created it. Epistemologically, I find that my perspective on the world is not the only possible [one] perspective. There is a point of view that I can never occupy, because the only way of defining it relative to my point of view is that it is not mine. Because the Other so radically escapes my cognition, it simultaneously threatens my freedom (to such a degree that I am inclined to murder) and awakens my desire (to such a degree that I am inclined to awe, and even to worship). The Other is at once the mysterium tremendum and the mysterium fascinans. If morality is understood as arising in the context of sociation, then the insight that the limits of my understanding become apparent precisely in this context would seem necessarily to have moral implications. Inasmuch as the Other fundamentally escapes my understanding, the forced totalization of the Other murder, in the extreme case is an imposition of my will for which a justification is, in principle, unavailable. As Levinas puts it, murder is impossible- not physically speaking, of course, but morally speaking (Levinas 1961/1969, 198-99). If I kill someone, it is fundamentally because I wish to be rid of the limits that are imposed by his or her presence. The cognitive and moral limits that are illuminated by the face, however, are not eliminated by removing the face from the purview of sensibility. The infinite distance between myself and the Other, once opened in my experience by the Other's epiphany, will remain open. My responsibility, once illuminated**,** is seen as a part of what I am. The commandment that was initially inscribed on the face of the Other is now inscribed on the heart of the same.19 "To be an I means . . . not to be able to escape responsibility. . . . The uniqueness of the I is the fact that no one can answer for me"(97). We must ground our ethics in reality by recognizing contact with the other—this proximity creates an infinite obligation to respect the other and avoid his or her totalization.

And, outweighs other framework warrants: I deny the empirical supposition that the other is like yourself, so they can’t justify the generalization of particular reasons in an ethical context. I contest a critical presupposition of their framework link chain.

contention:

I contend that forcing employers to pay a living wage is totalizing.

**First,** the government should not define what is necessary for a good life – by coercing employers into paying a living wage, the government affirms that more money is necessary in order for people to live properly, but that assumes people are not Stoics or Epicureans and rejects the value of alternative viewpoints, making a judgment about what people should want for them by viewing them solely as receptacles of economic power. Don’t claim living wages are voluntary and thus don’t totalize – a) that would be non-textual since the res says employers will be required to pay them and b) that would gut aff solvency since if accepting wages was voluntary, then employers could coerce employees into either *not* accepting the living wage or not being hired, similar to what happens in the status quo.

**Second,** the state coercively determines the conditions of fair employment, which makes a universal judgment rather than accounting for everyone’s situation or wants. Limiting of free contract reinforces the ideals of the government as a guide to what people ought to value and limits the possibility of coming to these conclusions independently. Universality totalizes people as non-relational economic objects rather than agents with complex interactions.

substance weighing/frontlines:

1. My framework is especially relevant to the topic since money is an inherently relational concept. Gendered language. **LEVINAS**[[3]](#footnote-3): And in still another sense, through this mediation, here is a strange or remarkable ambiguity of the human: in the adventure – or the trivial details – of being, man will have had, through money, the power of acquiring goods and services – things and human labour – and invisibly entering, through economic interconnections via the payment of wages, into possession of the very [people] who work, but at the same time, already in the event of exchange – of which money is a part, from where it starts out its mediating role and to which it never ceases to refer – man will have had recourse to the other man in the encounter that is neither the simple addition of individual to individual nor the violence of conquest, nor the perception of an object showing itself in its truth, but an every- thing-against-the-face of precisely the other man who already, silently, calls him and to whom he gives a response: declaration of peace in the Shalom or good wish in the hello [bonjour]. Recognition without prior acquaintance. Saluta- tion. Response or originary responsibility, the ‘addressing oneself to’ of all discourse. In money one can never forget this interhuman proximity, transcendence – and sociality that already runs through it, from one to one, from stranger to stranger, the trans-action from which all money proceeds, that all money animates.

2. The aff emphasis on money is a destruction of individual conceptions of altruistic life in service to the Other apart from the dominant economic order. **LEVINAS**[[4]](#footnote-4): One must nevertheless wonder whether a humanity entering the totality of the economic order deriving from inter-estedness – but also deriving from transactions embedded in money, which is born from exchange between men – would be mercilessly bound to being a totalitar- ian system. The economic totality of men in possession of money does not resemble the formal structure – or logic – of a sum of parts, without remainder, within a whole that absorbs them. Does the totality of an economic order not contain a whole in which men in possession of money and purchasers integrate themselves into the commodity but at the same time – in having and possessing – do not exhaust themselves – do not lose their souls? Beyond the axiology of inter-estedness, beyond the appetite for being, beyond the restlessness of each for his rest- fulness, for his being-there, for his share in existing, beyond the concern for that which has so admirably been called Da-sein, the concern that we decipher in the needs that money can satisfy – but as much in the possible cruelties of the ‘struggle for life’ – is not man also the astonishing possibility – exception to the edict of all modes of being! – of giving his place, the Da, to sacrifice himself for the other, to die for the stranger? Have we not ever been astonished by this extra-vagant possibility of the ‘human animal’, stronger than any ontology in which, in the human – in the face of the other man, before any Scripture – is heard the silent call or imperative, holiness: new axiology in which God comes to mind and through which the message of the Book lets itself be translated and understood?

reasons to prefer:

1. Identity formation is a prerequisite because in order for me to follow any interpersonal rule imposed by morality, I need to know what the “I” consists of in relation to others. **BUTLER[[5]](#footnote-5)**: For her, the very structure of address, that through which the question is posed, gives us the clue to understanding the significance of the question itself. For her, the question most central to recognition is a direct one, and it is addressed to the Other: [is] “who are you?” This question assumes that there is an Other before us, one we do not know, whom we cannot fully apprehend, one whose uniqueness and nonsubstitutability set a limit to the model of reciprocal recognition offered within the Hegelian scheme, and to the possibility of knowing another more generally. Cavarero argues that we are beings who are, of necessity, [necessarily] *exposed* to one another, and that our political situation consists in part in learning how best to handle this constant and necessary exposure. In a sense, this theory of the “outside” to the subject radicalizes the ecstatic trend in the Hegelian position. In her view, I am not, as it were, an interior subject, closed upon myself, solipsistic, posing questions of myself alone. I exist in an important sense for you, and by virtue of you. If I have lost the conditions of address, if I have no “you” to address, then I have lost “myself.” In her view, one can only tell an autobiography, one can only reference an “I” in relation to a “you”: without the “you,” my own story becomes impossible.

1) Care for the Other accords with the moral intuition of beneficence. [*Intuitions are important since they are inescapable reasons for action and the only way to compare premises that can’t be deductively derived further].* **BEAVERS:[[6]](#footnote-6)** To get a sense of how powerful Levinas' notion of substitution is, let me depart from the vocabulary of his language for a moment and cast the discussion into concrete terms. Suppose for a moment that you are walking down the street and the person in front of you pushes a garbage can into the street. You might pick up the garbage can, you might not— but, certainly you will not feel like an injustice has been done to the garbage can. Now suppose that in the same situation, the person in front of you pushes another person into the street. Suppose further that this person, while lying on the ground looks up at you. Do you "feel" the need to respond? Levinas says that at this moment, the ethical command has been waged. You are obligated to respond. If the desire to respond does not, at first, present itself as a command, and you respond because you want to respond, then you have just been witness to the depth that substitution has taken in your own being. The desire to respond is already a responsiveness to the command of the other. Some ethicists find that if we respond to the person because we feel a personal need to do so, then we are really satisfying our own desire, and, as such, our action does not have true moral worth. Levinas' point is more profound on this score. He notes that there is a metaphysical explanation for why we have this desire to respond. The explanation is rooted, once again, in substitution. First of all, the person has a transcendence that the garbage can does not have, and secondly, we have, in fact, already substituted ourselves for the other.23 Within Levinas' framework, the desire to help the other emerges because I am held hostage by the other to the core of my being, and, in substitution, I am made to stand for the other, before freedom and reason comes on the scene.

3) The basis for your philosophy is denying the freedom of others. **BENSON:[[7]](#footnote-7)**. Emmanuel Levinas and Nietzsche effectively agree on at least one thing: the history of Western philosophy has been the history of an attempt to achieve a sense of totality through a mastery of our experiences. From its very beginning, philosophy has tended toward ideology As we saw in the previous chapter, it has the goal of adequation by way of systematizing. Levinas seeks of “the strict coinciding of thought… and the idea of reality in which this thought thinks” (BPW 130). Yet whereas Nietzsche reads this attempt at adequation and systematizing as epistemologically and metaphysically problematic, LEVINAS points out that it is likewise morally questionable. It is not just that in philosophizing human[s] beings tend to go beyond their own capabilities; more important, human beings tend to do a kind of ethical violence to that which is other—to the phenomena in general, to human “others” and ultimately to God. Whereas philosophers have tended to see what they do as merely innocent attempt to understand what which is other to them, Levinas sees the desire to systematize as an attempt to control that which is other to me by making it minded. In other words, I wish to recast the other in my own image.

4) It precludes ontologically since the framework argues that traditional conceptions of what moral agents are fail to account for the whole person. Only avoiding totalization is consistent with what it means to be. Ontology comes first since we make assumption about what is when we formulate the ought, implying a theory of being.

5) Specifying the content of obligation is impossible unless we keep open the difference of the Other. **CROWE[[8]](#footnote-8):** Levinas suggests in *Totality and Infinity* that the irreducible strangeness of the Other presents an unavoidable ethical demand, which radically resists definition. He argues that our sense of ourselves as individuals is necessarily bound up with our recognition of the ethical status of the Other. We initially become aware of our individuality by distinguishing ourselves from objects in our environment, which we appropriate and represent as aids to our enjoyment. Our awareness of objects leads to language, as objects are communicated and thematised. It also leads to an awareness of the Other. We initially attempt to thematise other people in the same way as objects.  [\*318]  However, as soon as [When] we purport to encapsulate the Other, it becomes clear that "the invoked is not what I comprehend;" the Other "is not under a category."  n24 The Other demands recognition because she resists thematisation; the other person, *qua* individual, cannot be reduced to a function of our own enjoyment. Our attempts to thematise the Other conflict with her fundamental "strangeness," her "very freedom."  n25 Simon Critchley usefully connects Levinas' observations about the alterity of the Other with the epistemological problem of other minds.  n26 Suppose I hear someone crying out in pain and rush to her aid. When I get there, the person denies that she was in pain at all. How can I know whether the remark is sincere? Ultimately, I cannot: the Other person's state of mind radically resists my knowledge. For Levinas, this radical resistance to understanding defines my encounter with the Other. Levinas' focus on alterity in *Totality and Infinity* leads him to emphasise the asymmetrical nature of the ethical encounter. The subject apprehends the Other as both unpredictable and unreliable.

6) Abstract ideas like the AC cannot constitute ethics. This approach towards ethics fails because it has no impact on the way we actually interact with people in the real world and instead only to refers the abstract idea of a person. **CHALIER:[[9]](#footnote-9)**. The intelligence is in the service of ideas, and this often makes it possible to construct an ideal, sometimes with universal moral or political implications; but the ideal remains without impact on the concrete commitments of the person professing it. Ignorance of particular[s] facts and persons in favor of the reverence due to notions and causes justifies the worst compromises. In that respect, Hegel detected an attitude typical of German intellectuals, always ready to give a distorted explanation of the situation in the name of their *notions*. That attitude is not the monopoly of German intellectuals, of course; it is the result of the very desire to seek universality through abstraction rather than concrete singularity. Yet abstraction is the very essence of knowledge and “philosophy itself*,”* which concerns itself with knowledge, “is characterized by the substitution of ideas for persons, of the theme for the interlocutor, of the interiority of the logical relationship for the exteriority of the act of questioning. Beings are reduced to the neutrality *[le Neutre]* of the idea, being, the concept.” And yet, how are we to deal with individuals [and] how are we to conceive of morality, in such abstract terms? Kant encountered that difficulty early on. “There was a time,” he writes, “when I believed this [thirst for knowledge] constituted the honor of humanity, and I despised the people, who know nothing. Rousseau corrected me in this. This binding prejudice disappeared. I learned to honor man.” Levinas observes that culture and its magnificent institutions—those of a Europe marked by centuries of Christianity and by the Enlightenment—offered almost no resistance to Nazi barbarism. Both philosophers, then, observe that ideas, even beautiful ones taken from humanism, are powerless to steer a person toward the good, the true, and the just, as soon as one judges, rightly or wrongly, that one’s own self-interest may be at stake. Thought, in this view, incurs no consequence in real life, and an intellectual, to avoid suffering, might alter his ideas or forget what he professes. The intellectual will then often feel contempt, jealousy and hatred towards those who tremble in fear when a beautiful thought is expressed if their own behavior is not consistent with it. But what value does a philosophy have if it vanishes when it is put to the test? What value do ideas about ethics have if human beings do not place the fear of transgressing them above their articulation? Kant and Levinas obviously do not abandon philosophy, but they remind us that thought transcends knowledge and is not an act of mastery tending to banish uncertainties, shortcoming and the threats from the outside. And it is precisely that dimension of humility—that consent at the limit of theoretical reason—that allows [Levinas] these philosophers to point[s] the way toward a moral philosophy not dependent upon theoretical knowledge and to keep alive the quest for the good. To do so, they [Levinas] seeks the source of morality in the subject and not in its level of knowledge. Both Kant and Levinas note that moral conduct sometimes prevails unexpectedly in one person or another. Hence, in the tragic twentieth century, “the memory of Jews and non-Jews, who, in the midst of the chaos, without even knowing or seeing one another, knew how to behave as if the world had not disintegrated,” arrests to the fact that ethics transcends institutions, since even those institutions called upon to educate people and ensure moral and political progress were compromised by the nihilist devastation. Ethics, says Levinas, thus resides entirely “in the obligation to lodge all the humanity of man in the ramshackle house of the conscience, exposed to the elements.” Form the point of view, ethics makes it impossible to remain content with abstractions when we are confronted with a being of flesh and blood, but it also commits us to ask how we are to conceive of and transmit that obligation. In fact, although it is true that no system of ideas can adequately account for such an obligation, Levinas’s statement does not serve to praise simple, uneducated people, since prejudices and the absence of thought are more likely to encourage brutality and hatred then they are to encourage a responsible attitude toward the weak. The ideologies of hatred go hand in hand with a lack of reflection. When Kant, taking his cue from Rousseau, remembers the honor residing in the ignorant and uncivilized people, he does not do so to praise ignorance in matters of morality.  When Levinas evokes the solitary conscience capable of behaving morally even when reason has broken down, he does not do so to champion the obliteration of culture. But both philosophers challenge[s] us to understand how and why the *moral subject* transcends the limits assigned to theoretical thought.

**AT impact justified standards:**

A philosophical attempt to understand justice as a single principle will only undermine itself and lead to catastrophic moral failing**. KELLER[[10]](#footnote-10):** Just before Europe plunged into World War II, Dutch historian Johan Huizinga wrote, “we live in a world possessed. And we know it.” The Nazis claimed to promote deep love of country and people. But somehow as they pursued this thing, “love of country,” their patriotism became demonic and destructive,. In the end, Nazism accomplished the vey opposite of what it sought—endless shame rather than national honor. In 1794, Maximilien Robespierre, the leader of the French Revolution, said to the National Convention, “What is the goal towards which we are heading? The peaceful enjoyment of liberty and equality…. The Terror is nothing other than prompt, severe, inflexible justice.” However, his “Reign of Terror” was so horrendously *un*just that Robespierre himself was made a scapegoat and guillotined without any trial. “Liberty and equality” are obviously great goods, but again, something went horribly wrong. A noble principle became “possessed,” went insane, and ultimately accomplished the very opposite of the justice the revolutionaries sought. What happened? Idolatry. When love of one’s people becomes an absolute, it turns into racism. When love of equality turns into a supreme thing, it can result in hatred and violence toward anyone who has led a privileged life. It is the settled tendency of human societies to turn good political causes into counterfeit gods. As we have mentioned, Ernest Becker wrote that in a society that has lost the reality of God, many people will look to romantic love ot give them the fulfillment they once found in religious experience. Nietzsche, however, believed it would be money that would replace God. But there is another candidate to fill this spiritual vacuum. WE can also look to politics. WE can look upon our political leaders as “messiahs,” our political policies as saving doctrine, and turn our political activism into a kind of religion.

kant specific:

1. My framework is better since Kant has a systematic structure of human personhood called practical reason that closes off the uniqueness of each individual person.

2. Kant assumes a universal form of disclosure that doesn’t exist. If I use property, I need permission from you. But what if you misunderstand what counts as their permission and they don’t actually consent? Whenever I totalize someone, I am claiming that what I think someone says counts as their will. This means we must resolve the totalization question before we can determine what counts as willing on the part of others. If I hear someone crying and they deny they are in pain, I cannot make that presupposition.

3. Kantian concept of freedom makes no sense – what that means are to begin with is itself a personal notion that each person must decide for themselves but Kantian philosophy cannot resolve questions based on our mental conception of ourselves rather than just our outer capacity to do things.

fwk frontlines:

**AT why is totalization unethical:**

The framework is side-constraint based; totalization is inconsistent with the cognitive limits of our own capacity to partake in any interaction with Others at all. **SIMMONS**[[11]](#footnote-11)**:** If morality is understood as arising in the context of sociation, then the insight that the limits of my understanding become apparent precisely in this context would seem necessarily to have moral implications. Inasmuch as the Other fundamentally escapes my understanding, the forced totalization of the Other - murder, in the extreme case - is an imposition of my will for which a justification is, in principle, unavailable. As Levinas puts it, murder is impossible - not physically speaking, of course, but morally speaking (Levinas 1961/1969, 198-99). If I kill someone, it is fundamentally because I wish to be rid of the limits that are imposed by his or her presence. The cognitive and moral limits that are illuminated by the face, however, are not eliminated by removing the face from the purview of sensibility. The infinite distance between myself and the Other, once opened in my experience by the Other's epiphany, will remain open. My responsibility, once illuminated, is seen as a part of what I am. The commandment that was initially inscribed on the face of the Other is now inscribed on the heart of the same.19

**AT this means no resuscitation:**

I need to try to figure out your perspective by resuscitating you in the first place to determine your preference. You’re going to make some presumption either way – but try to figure out what you want. I don’t know what their friends want for their birthday. If I ask and they say it should be a surprise, I’ve still respected their identity. You need to the other speak for itself before you can interact ethically with it.

**AT Levinas doesn’t have specific obligations:**

- You’re asking the wrong kind of question that presumes specific obligations exist across the board. Levinas’ whole point is that determining the specific content of positive obligations to the Other is impossible to generalize. It’s like saying I can’t tell if it’s foggy outside because the air isn’t clear enough.

**AT racism/oppression turns:**

- You cannot reduce a person to race or socioeconomic status. It’s extremely totalizing to assume we can decide what is good for a group by presuming how express themselves in the way we want to hear.

- Always prefer my offense since it’s intrinsic to the nature of a living wage, whereas we can always try to reduce obstacles to blacks but not proactively use the method of the aff to give them assistance. Your offense is not a unique reason to affirm.

- You are talking about solving a foreseen harm, but you cannot totalize to do so since that would be wrong. It would be comparatively better to omit action.

extra cards:

Associating the other with categories is unethical. **DERRIDA** explains the argument:[[12]](#footnote-12) Now, having said this--again very simply, in a way which is too simple--I think we do not have to choose between unity and multiplicity. Of course, deconstruction--that has been its strategy up to now.-insisted not on multiplicity for itself but on the heterogeneity, the difference, the disassociation, which is absolutely necessary for the relation to the other. What disrupts the totality is the condition for the relation to the other. The privilege granted to unity, to totality, to organic ensembles, to community as a homogenized whole--this is a danger for responsibility, for decision, for ethics, for politics. That is why I insisted on what prevents unity from closing upon itself, from being closed up. This is not only a matter of description, of saying that this is the way it is. It is a matter of accounting for the possibility of responsibility, of a decision, of ethical commitments. To understand this, you have to pay attention to what I would call singularity. Singularity is not simply unity or multiplicity. Now, this does not mean that we have to destroy all forms of unity wherever they occur. I have never said anything like that. Of course, we need unity, some gathering, some configuration. You see, pure unity or pure multiplicity--when there is only totality or unity and when there is only multiplicity or disassociation--is a synonym of death. What interests me is the limit of every attempt to totalize, to gather, versammeln--and I will come to this German word in a moment, because it is important for me--the limit of this unifying, uniting movement, the limit that it had to encounter, because the relationship of the unity to itself implies some difference. To be more concrete, take the example of a person or of a culture. We often insist nowadays on cultural identity--for instance, national identity, linguistic identity, and so on. Sometimes the struggles under the banner of cultural identity, national identity, linguistic identity, are noble fights. But at the same time the people who fight for their identity must pay attention to the fact that identity is not the self-identity of a thing, this glass, for instance, this microphone, but implies a difference within identity. That is, the identity of a culture is a way of being different from itself; a culture is different from itself; language is different from itself; the person is different from itself. Once you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own identity is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity. And this prevents totalitarianism, nationalism, egocentrism, and so on. That is what I tried to demonstrate in the book called The Other Heading: in the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a self-differentiating identity, an identity different from itself, having an opening or gap within itself [ AC15-17/ OH9-11]. That totally affects a structure, but it is a duty, an ethical and political duty, to take into account this impossibility of being one with oneself. It is because I am not one with myself that I can speak with the other and address the other. That is not a way of avoiding responsibility. On the contrary, it is the only way for me to take responsibility and to make decisions. That raises one of my questions regarding Heidegger. As you know, deconstruction owes a lot to Heidegger. That is a complex problem that I cannot take up now. Nevertheless, one of the recurrent critiques or deconstructive questions I pose to Heidegger has to do with the privilege Heidegger grants to what he calls Versammlung, gathering, which is always more powerful than dissociation. I would say exactly the opposite [cf. SdM49-57/ SoM23-29]. 10 Once you grant some privilege to gathering and not to dissociating, then you leave no room for the other, for the radical otherness of the other, for the radical singularity of the other. I think, from that point of view, separation, dissociation is not an obstacle to society, to community, but the condition. We addressed this a moment ago with the students. 11 Dissociation, separation, is the condition of my relation to the other. I can address the Other only to the extent that there is a separation, a dissociation, so that I cannot replace the other and vice versa. That is what some French-speaking philosophers such as Blanchot and Levinas call the "rapport sans rapport," the relationless relation [cf. Foi84-85]. 12 The structure of my relation to the other is of a "relation without relation." It is a relation in which the other remains absolutely transcendent. I cannot reach the other. I cannot know the other from the inside and so on. That is not an obstacle but the condition of love, of friendship, and of war, too, a condition of the relation to the other. So, dissociation is the condition of community, the condition of any unity as such.

No account the “I” provides will ever be capable of giving the Other a totalized understanding of who she is. **BUTLER[[13]](#footnote-13)**: If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and understandable, then I might begin with a narrative account of my life, but this narrative will be disoriented by what is not mine, or what is not mine alone. And I will, to some degree, have to make myself substitutable in order to make myself recognizable. The narrative authority of the “I” must give way to the perspective and temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of my story. We can surely still tell our stories—and there will be many reasons to do precisely that—but we will not be able to be very authoritative when we try to give an account with a narrative structure. The “I” cannot tell the story of its own emergence, and the conditions of its own possibility, without in some sense bearing witness to a state of affairs to which one could not have been present, prior to one’s own becoming, and so narrating that which one cannot know. Fictional narration requires no referent to work as narrative, and we might say that the irrecoverability of the referent, its foreclosure to us, is the very condition of possibility for an account of myself, if that account is to take narrative form. It does not destroy narrative but produces it precisely in a fictional direction. So to be more precise, I would have to say that I can tell the story of my origin and even tell it again and again, in several ways; but the story of my origin I tell is not one for which I am accountable, and it cannot establish my accountability. At least, let’s hope not, since, over wine usually, I tell it in various ways, and the accounts are not always consistent with one another. Indeed, it may be that to have an origin means precisely to have several possible versions of the origin—I take it that this is part of what Nietzsche meant by the operation of genealogy. Any one of those are possible narratives, but of no single one can I [cannot] say with certainty that it [any account I give of myself] is true.

We must understand the limitations of our ability to account for who we are. The most unethical action capable of being taken is one which narrativizes Others. **DEAN[[14]](#footnote-14):** For Butler, experiencing the limits of our ability to account for ourselves enables a “new sense of ethics” that she speaks of as the [through]“acknowledgement of the limits of acknowledgement itself” (33). She writes, “It would be perhaps an [this new sense of] ethics [is] based on our shared, and invariable, partial blindnesses about ourselves. The recognition that one is, at every turn, not quite the same as what one thinks that one is, might imply, in turn, [which allows for] a certain patience for others that suspends the demand that they be self-same at every moment” (33). And, of course, this recognition is itself necessarily imperfect. Thus, Butler adds that the acknowledgement of the limits of acknowledgement itself can “constitute a disposition of humility, and of generosity, since I will need to be forgiven for what I cannot fully know, what I could not have fully known, and I will be under a similar obligation to offer forgiveness to others who are also constituted in partial opacity to themselves” (34). The lack in what we can know about ourselves thus might [can] be understood as the lack in what others know about themselves. And, although I may often be tempted to fill in this gap with an always impossible certainty, my ability to cultivate an awareness of this lack could enable me to be more forgiving of others and perhaps even of myself. Allowing for openness, not demanding an impossible accounting from another, becomes here, for Butler, another, better, version of recognition because it recognizes the desire to persist.

polls interaction:

1. Statistics of this sort are totalizing since they don’t consider nuance in response and assume because a similar question was asked one way it would apply in another instance. They base a judgment about your will based upon your split-second yes or no answer to a phone question or survey you take like 1 min of your life to answer.

2. The assumption that we reduce people’s opinion is problematic – for one person it might have a huge negative effect while for others it would have a really small effect. Means that they fail to guide interpersonal interaction since I can’t make moral judgments until I know what people actually feel affected, but that is impossible.

ontology or epistemolgy stuff:

1) Transcendence is having my interiority brought into question. Ontologically, I find that I am not the only possible source of reality. Although I am capable of creating, I experience a presence within the world that so overflows and escapes from my experience that I could not have created.

2) Epistemologically, I find that my perspective on the world is not the only possible perspective. There is a point of view that I can never occupy, because the only way of defining it relative to

my point of view is that it is not mine.

rawls specific stuff:

The idea that you can isolate the veil of ignorance as some analytic thing that just exists and can be abstracted for each person is totalizing because all of our material conceptions of what counts as good might differ from person to person.

role of the ballot analysis:

The fundamental question is do we philosophize and come to the conclusion \_\_\_ pervades everything and then decide on ethics. Or not use any philosophical theorizing as a gateway and then invite the other to intrude upon our existence and fracture our theorizing at its foundation.

Only Levinas approach can possibly fulfill the ROB and methodologically reorient our value. To attempt to recognize or categories is to already use my own values in assessing the content of my obligation, and thus only by situating in first philosophy can ethics transcend to a true reordering. Further, even the project of negating against western philosophy is to be defined in dominated in terms of it, such that only the NC can solve. Finally, Levinas acknowledges the infinite obligation prior to even the consciousness recognition which is all that allows the content of the obligation to finally reorder conscious experience. **BLOECHL[[15]](#footnote-15):**

The philosophy of Levinas presents us with a theory of attachment to the other person prior to any contact, encounter, or liaison. According to Levinas, my neighbor is the “first one on the scene” (AE 109/OB 87), looking at me and calling to me before any question of applying calculus or categories to determine his proximity. “He orders me from before being recognized.” The very act of recognizing him is itself already a response to him. Recognition is already ordered by what it tries to capture in an image; to form an image of one’s neighbor is already to respond to him. If the neighbor is truly the first one on the scene, not even the work of negation is enough to get free of Levinas’s strictures: for me to negate every image I form of the other person is still to define him starting from myself, and so to retain our relation within a logic of identity and an anthropology of self-assertion. For Levinas, the relation with my neighbor is a “relation of kinship outside all biology, "against all logic.’ ” My neighbor is “precisely other. ” In order to understand how we may relate to this extraordinary otherness without immediately betraying it, it is first necessary to examine the conditions by which it is said to reveal itself. Why? Not simply because this otherness exceeds the reach of every concept, but also because all concepts have already been put in the wake of its experience and thought. The claim that my neighbor is the "first one on the scene” directs thinking not only to the extreme degree to which his otherness transcends me, but also to an understanding of myself which says that everything I am and do takes place after the fact of a relation with the Other. Defining this fact, Levinas always speaks the language of ethics and religion.1 Community with my neighbor begins “in my obligation to him.” This obligation, however, is not conscious, or rather, consciousness always arrives after the fact of the obligation. ,One is always already obliged. One starts from a debt so deep and so ravenous that it swallows the act of recognizing it. The relation with my neighbor would thus be a matter first and above all of a debt which is infinite.

And the root cause of the violence behind all Western ethics has been one of exclusive violence via the drawing of categories. Only the NC solves the problem. **HAGGLUND[[16]](#footnote-16):** Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the ethico-theoretical decision of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergence from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of alientation and the derirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any positive term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its other. Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptability, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world [he continues] In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of those excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more of less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted.

This role of the ballot is particularly important in spaces of communication like debate. **HANNAN[[17]](#footnote-17):** The notion of interruption is based primarily on the work of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, and secondarily on the work of literary critics Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida. According to Pinchevski, communication is always and forever incomplete and imperfect, and were we to actually have successful communication, there would be no further need to communicate. We know from practical experience, however, that we are in constant need of communication. It follows, therefore, that the practical ideals that have hitherto governed our attitudes toward communication are not just elusive, but detrimental to communication itself. Rather, what we need to keep communication going is an appreciation of the differences between us. Understanding begins not when we have achieved a perfect unity of minds, but rather when our orientation toward seamlessness and harmony is interrupted by the unassimilable voice of the Other. Here, Pinchevski incorporates Levinas’ crucial distinction between the Said and the Saying. The Said can best be understood as the formal, logical dimension of communication. By demarcating the boundaries of meaningful discourse, it necessarily includes and excludes. The Saying, however, is the pre-rational dimension of communication that frequently gets excluded by the regulatory regime of the former. Pinchevski insists that the hegemony of the Said must be effectively questioned and dislocated so that the voice of alterity, that which resides within the realm of the Saying, might be permitted to thrive.

at CP violates:

1) Even if you are correct that the CP determines things via money, that isn’t responsive since there is a uniqueness problem. The AC does that as well; the tiebreaker is whether or not that conception of the good is imposed upon other people. There is nothing wrong with the government determining what a life worth living is, so long as it doesn’t declare that this conception of a life with money is one that is so correct that everyone must accept it – which means the violation is always comparatively less since some categorization occurs regardless; the framing issue is whether or not the concept of a good life is imposed on other people as the *only sort of life* that they can accept.

2) The NC is about imposing a concept, not violating property rights. The idea that taxes totalize is to assume that you really own your property in a robust sense which you probably don’t have a link to; there is no reason why taxing you is totalizing because it is unclear why property is part of you in my account. To claim this person has a property right is to award their interest in their thing over anothers thus to not tax people as redistibution is just as totaling as to tax people since either way that sort of claim is made.

3) The state only imposes the ideal that the CP is good via taxes if people choose to use it. If people choose to not use it, then it does not. That also means my violation outweighs because yours is dependent on contingent conditions related to the implementation of the aff, while mine is inherent to the structure of a living wage.

at turns/answers:

*AT LW is not a mandate to work etc. and not bad:*

the turn is self-refuting and proves you shouldn’t affirm - if that is all LW is why not just stick with the current minimum wage if its just a random wage that does not correlate to what is required to live a good life. What in the world are we talking about then? Obviously a living wage is the imposition by the government of a certain kind of life being good enough to “live,” and that standardization is the problem.

*AT low wages are more totalizing:*

What would be totalizing is to restrict their ABILITY to choose their wages, because whether wages are low or high the contract is still governed by the employer, who can fire or hire at will. In fact, the CP solves because they have more bargaining power since they have money regardless of what their employer says.

*AT totalization inevitable:*

1) its a matter of not totalizing in each instance; it may be for instance that you will still totalize in some other fashion but it is better to totalize in one fashion than to totalize in that fashion.

2) this is not a problem – use the analogy of kant, I will probbaly always be instrumentalizing other people adn not treating them as ultimate ends in thesmselves because I am selfish and things. Nevertheless if this action definitely uses someone as a means to an end I should not do it.

3) that just proves we will never be truly ethical it does not seem to be a reason to not stop acts that are clearly bad.

at aggregation:

I cannot totalize to prevent someone else from doing so:

a) you cannot aggregate, because aggregation concepts are the basis of all totalization – the idea we can amalgamate people into one race, one identity, one way of life etc.

b) To totalize in this way to stop another totalization is to reduce someone as an object of manipulation which is the most fundametnal type of totalization

c) the ethical theory cannot be aggregative as the content of the obligation could be known only after complex social reflection but once you abstract out away from the ethical imperative of the Other you are no longer responding to the Oother but instead to the other as social construct.

util interaction:

NO aggregation under the standard:

1. Totalizing is a mindset that closes off any possibility of an ethical interaction with a person since we deny the nature of personhood, so it’s contradictory to totalize for the further end of minimizing oppression.

2. You can’t aggregate since each person is inaccessible since they hold a metaphysical view you cannot access – means you can’t know of their pleasure and their pain to begin with when doing util calc.

3. Ontological considerations come first – our ethical actions must be consistent with the structure of human identity since we make assumptions about is when formulating util ought. This means util denies what is means to be a person in relation with others, so it cannot govern interpersonal relations.

4. The framework bites in to the criticism Levinas argues since it assumes a systematic characteristic of human personhood, which is our capacity to experience pleasure while closing off anything else that might define our existence like outer freedom or virtue etc.

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